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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two centuries ago, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “[w]here 
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes 
everything from which aid can be derived.”1 Yet for more than half a 
century, Congress has forbidden judges to use the evidence before their 
own eyes when interpreting the federal Judicial Code. In what will 
come as a surprise to most readers, Congress has directed judges to 
ignore the plainly visible structure of logically organized parts and 
                                                                                                                     
 * Orestes A. Brownson Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law 
(Minnesota). For valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article that 
strengthened the analysis, but retaining full responsibility for substance of the final version, the 
author thanks Judith Resnik, Kevin Clermont, David Shapiro, Thomas Mengler, Philip Frickey, 
and Jay Tidmarsh. 
 1. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358, 386 (1805). 
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chapters with their identifying headings into which statutory sections 
have been placed through the 1948 enactment of Title 28 of the United 
States Code.2 
In an uncodified provision, Congress instructed that “[n]o inference 
of a legislative construction is to be drawn” by the location of a section 
in a particular chapter in Title 28 nor by the “catchlines” for parts, 
chapters, and sections.3 Thus, this little-known and half-hidden section 
casts the the Judicial Code’s brightly-lit profile into jurisprudential 
darkness. 
In the sculptures and statues that ornament our courthouses, the 
Roman goddess Justicia often is portrayed with the sword of justice in 
one hand, the scales for weighing just deserts in the other hand, and a 
blindfold across her eyes symbolizing her lack of preferential favor for 
any person.4 While blindfolded to ward against the corruption of 
personal partiality,5 the assumption remains that Lady Justice can still 
see the law clearly with the eyes of the mind. But when abstruse 
legislation clouds the legal mind,6 Lady Justice must lift her blindfold 
so that the visible contours of the law come into sharper relief.7 
Sixty years of legislatively-imposed blindness on the federal 
judiciary is more than enough. The time has long since passed to retire 
this mischievous provision, to introduce transparency to the 
interpretation of the provisions collected in Title 28, and to let the light 
shine upon the federal Judicial Code’s carefully designed structure.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (revising and codifying Title 28). See 
also infra Part II. 
 3. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. 
 4. See Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1727, 1755 
(1987). This familiar icon of Justice—“the oddly dressed woman with a set of attributes (scales, 
sword, and sometimes a blindfold)”—dates to the medieval and Renaissance periods. Judith 
Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-
First Century Courthouses, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 139, 143–45 (2007). Beginning with 
Babylonian iconography, “one can trace Justice’s roots through goddesses both Greek and 
Roman, from Themis and Dike to Iusitia,” and into Christian representations in the Middle Ages 
of the Virtues. Id. As Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis conclude in their study of the symbol, this 
particular image of Justice has achieved near-universal recognition and has enjoyed remarkable 
durability because “it has been deployed, politically, by governments seeking to link their rules 
and judgments to her legitimacy.” Id. at 145. 
 5. Although understood today to “suggest[] judgment uncorrupted,” placing a blindfold 
on an image of Justice during the Renaissance often carried “negative connotations,” such as 
Justice’s eyes being “bandaged to keep her from having to see the pain caused by the sanctions 
imposed in the name of the law,” the eyes being covered to communicate “the pain of 
judgment,” or Justice being blindfolded by a fool to lead her “astray.” Resnik & Curtis, supra
note 4, at 160–64. In more recent times, the blindfold has come to be commonly used as a 
celebrated attribute of the icon. Id at 163. 
 6. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 7. See infra Parts V & VI. 
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II.   INTERPRETING STATUTES IN CONTEXT AND THE 1948 STRUCTURAL 
REVISION OF THE JUDICIAL CODE 
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words of a 
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.”8 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
describe “the main lines of textual inquiry” as including consideration 
of “how the statutory provision at issue coheres with the general 
structure of the statute.”9 Given that statutory provisions typically are 
organized into separately-named parts and chapters within a particular 
legislative act or as codified within a title of the United States Code, the 
location of a particular statutory section within the broader structure of a 
legislative enactment may communicate essential information about 
how that section should be understood.10 
The importance of structure may be especially evident when the 
interpretive question focuses on the basic nature of a provision, such as 
whether it states a jurisdictional, substantive, or procedural rule. 
Divining the essential nature of a statutory rule may be critical or 
dispositive to the outcome of a lawsuit. When a provision is embedded 
into jurisdictional bedrock, for example, the parties are deprived of the 
ability to decide which issues to litigate and which to waive or forfeit, 
the court assumes the burden to raise the matter sua sponte, and both the 
court and the parties may be prevented from reaching the merits.11 
Regarding the salience of structure on such a question, consider Zipes v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,12 in which the Supreme Court held that the 
timely filing of an employment discrimination charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission was not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to suit in federal court. The Court observed that the 
provision actually granting the court jurisdiction “contains no reference 
to the timely-filing requirement,” while the provision setting the time 
limitation appears as an entirely separate section of the legislation.13 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2002). 
 9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354–44 (1990); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 
439, 449 (1988) (explaining that the conclusion that certain civilian employment matters are not 
subject to judicial review under the Civil Service Reform Act or otherwise “emerges not only 
from the statutory language, but also from . . . the structure of the statutory scheme”). 
 10. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2008) 
(“find[ing] it informative that Congress placed” a statutory section within a particularly labeled 
subchapter). 
 11. See infra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 12. 455 U.S. 385 (1982). 
 13. Id. at 383–94; see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (“[W]hen 
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat 
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”). 
3
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The central place of structure in statutory construction may be a 
noteworthy common ground in the ongoing debate over methods of 
interpretation. Textualists, who are more likely to find “that the 
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship 
with other laws,”14 may give greatest weight to structural context within 
a codified title. At the same time, those advocating alternative 
approaches to ascertaining or reconstructing legislative intent will also 
find salient evidence in the purposeful structure of a code. 
Intentionalists, moreover, will take note of statements in the legislative 
history behind a revision and codification of a set of laws that 
emphasize the importance that Congress attached to the coherent 
arrangement of chapters and sections.15 
For the federal judiciary, the rules of the adjudicative game—the 
organization of the courts, jurisdiction and venue, procedure, and 
adoption of court rules—are to be found in various provisions of the 
Judicial Code, codified today in Title 28 of the United States Code. Any 
particular section addressing these court-related matters ideally should 
be interpreted so that it “fit[s] harmoniously within a set of provisions 
composing a coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the 
United States Code.”16 And, indeed, Congress adopted a careful and 
deliberate organization for Title 28 that should facilitate judicial 
interpretation. But the work of the code revisers and the action of 
Congress in enacting that meticulously designed structure appears to be 
of little avail in terms of judicial interpretation—a disappointing 
postscript to the 1948 codification.17 
Prior to 1948, Title 28 of the United States Code had not been 
enacted as an integrated statute and thus served only as prima facie 
evidence of the law, making it necessary for lawyers and judges “to 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 521. 
 15. William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett question whether, in light of 
the less than “single-minded” nature of “actual legislative practice,” the “whole act rule,” by 
which a statutory provision is interpreted in a “holistic” manner within a statutory scheme, is 
consistent with an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY &  ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 263 
(2000). Nonetheless, they conclude that “on rule of law grounds,” “there might be greater legal 
legitimacy, as well as aesthetic advantage, if courts presume coherence among statutes as well 
as within statutes.” Id. at 264. In addition, when Congress passes a revision and codification of a 
title within the United States Code, there may be a stronger basis for believing that the 
integrated whole accurately reflects collective legislative intent. As confirmed by the history of 
the 1948 code revision that is sketched in the following text, when Congress undertakes to 
specifically revise and codify an entire Title, it is acting with unique, specific, and common 
intent to create that very “coherence among statutes.” See id. 
 16. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 136 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (discussing appellate review of remand orders in removed cases). 
 17. See infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text. 
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refer back to the Judicial Code of 1911 and to later volumes of the 
Statutes at Large in order to determine the exact text of any statutory 
provision.”18 In 1948, to address this unsatisfactory state of affairs and 
to bring the law up to date, Congress  enacted the revised and 
reorganized provisions of the Judicial Code into positive law, through 
the codification of Title 28 of the United States Code.19 
Regarding the project to revise and codify Title 28, which 
culminated in the 1948 Act, the Supreme Court said: 
This was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation. To the 
contrary, it received close and prolonged study. Five years 
of Congressional attention supports the Code. And from the 
start, Congress obtained the most eminent expert assistance 
available. The spadework was entrusted to two law-book-
publishing firms, the staffs of which had unique experience 
in statutory codification and revision. They formed an 
advisory committee, including distinguished judges and 
members of the bar, and obtained the services of special 
consultants. Furthermore, an advisory committee was 
appointed by the Judicial Conference. And to assist with 
matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief 
Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting 
of himself and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas.20 
The textual framework of the Title 28 revision and codification was 
a clear, meaningful, and deliberately-constructed structure upon which 
judges, lawyers, and ordinary citizens could rely. Congress’s 
conscientious purpose in classifying statutes within the Judicial Code’s 
various parts, chapters, and subchapters is plainly stated in the House 
Report on the legislation: 
The first step in revision was the preparation of a 
preliminary analysis—the framework upon which to build 
the new title. In drafting this outline the old system of 
classification was discarded and modern subject matter 
arrangement was substituted. The material was divided into 
six major categories. Part I provides for organization of 
courts; part II treats of the attorneys and marshals; part III 
covers court officers and employees; part IV sets forth the 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Alexander Holtzoff, The New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 343, 343–44 (1948-
49). 
 19. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. For a history of the enactment of the 
federal Judicial Code in Title 28, see generally 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
EDWARD H. COOPER &  RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3509 (2007); 
Holtzoff, supra note 18. 
 20. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1949). 
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provisions on jurisdiction and venue; part V deals with 
procedure; and part VI takes up particular proceedings. 
Within these parts, the subject matter was arranged 
under appropriate chapter heads. The numbering system 
adopted makes adequate provision for future legislation. 
Chapters were given odd numbers, leaving the even 
numbers available for related chapters containing future 
acts. Sufficient section numbers were left between chapters 
to accommodate such growth.21 
Unfortunately, while winding up the meticulous process of enacting 
the revision of Title 28, Congress apparently lost its nerve and was 
unwilling to allow these deliberate choices to be recognized by the 
courts as reflecting actual legislative intent. In a little-known and 
uncodified provision of the 1948 legislation, Congress precluded the 
courts from drawing a direct inference of legislative intent from the fact 
that a particular statutory section was classified within a certain chapter 
of Title 28 under a specific descriptive heading. Section 33 of the 1948 
Revision of Title 28 reads: “No inference of a legislative construction is 
to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial 
Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any section is 
placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title.”22 
                                                                                                                     
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 5 (1947). 
 22. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. A nearly identical uncodified 
provision applies to Title 18, the federal criminal code, which was revised and codified as part 
of the same 1948 Act. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (“No inference of a 
legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any particular section is placed, nor by 
reason of the catchlines used in such title.”). Similar language, reciting that no inference of a 
legislative construction is to be drawn from the placement of a section into a chapter or within 
the United States Code or from the caption or catchline of a provision, has been enacted as well 
with respect to the codification of other titles of the United States Code, including Title 13 
(Census), Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1158, § 5, 68 Stat. 1024; Title 14 (Coast Guard), Act of 
Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, § 3, 63 Stat. 557; Title 26 (Internal Revenue Code), 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) 
(2006); Title 31 (Money and Finance), Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 4(e), 96 Stat. 877, 1067 (1982); 
Title 36 (Patriotic and National Observances, Ceremonies, and Organizations), Pub. L. No. 105-
225, § 5(e), 112 Stat. 1253, 1499 (1998); Title 39 (Postal Service), Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 11(b), 
84 Stat. 719, 785 (1970); Title 40 (Public Buildings, Property, and Works), Pub. L. No. 107-
217, § 5(f), 116 Stat. 1062, 1304 (2002); and Title 44 (Public Printing and Documents), Pub. L. 
No. 90-620, § 2(e), 82 Stat. 1238, 1306 (1968). While largely hidden provisions erasing the 
significance of the deliberately-enacted structure of a code in construing its provisions strike me 
as equally pernicious elsewhere in the law, my lack of expertise in fields such as criminal law 
and tax causes me to hesitate from proposing a repeal of these similar blindness directives. 
Making the case for unveiling the structure of Title 28 for forthright use in judicial interpretation 
is sufficient work for one article. Most importantly, as addressed above in the text, one of the 
most distinctive features and crowning achievements of the codification of Title 28 was its 
structure and classification of provisions into designated parts and chapters. 
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By enacting the § 33 codicil to the revision and codification of Title 
28, Congress perhaps wished to avoid inadvertent changes in law.23 To 
be sure, in general, the 1948 revision legislation was designed to clarify, 
simplify, and harmonize statutory provisions governing the judiciary 
rather than to make substantive changes in the law.24 But while “the 
majority of the provisions of the Code constitute restatements of 
existing law, as is generally true of most codifications,” the Judicial 
Code revisers deliberately introduced “[a] number of changes in the 
law,” some of which were understood to be of “considerable 
consequence.”25 Major substantive changes in the Title 28 revisions 
enacted in 1948 included new provisions defining diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction to include suits between citizens of the District 
of Columbia and citizens of different states, granting authority to district 
courts to transfer venue, directing that petitions for removal of cases 
from state to federal court are to be filed only in the federal court, and 
setting a uniform period for filing a notice of appeal in civil cases.26 
And among those revisions to the Judicial Code in which the drafters 
took special pride was the careful classification of jurisdictional, 
substantive, procedural, and other provisions into designated parts and 
chapters.27 “[F]ar from being a random collection of provisions,” the 
organization of Title 28 was by conscious and scrupulous design.28 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Beyond reciting that the section “provides against any inference of a legislative 
construction by reason of the classification of any section in a particular chapter or by reason of 
the captions or catch lines used throughout the title,” the legislative history sheds no light on the 
congressional purpose behind adoption of this veiling provision. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 7 
(1947). 
 24. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and 
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 279 (2003) (“The legislative history described revisions of 
Title 28 in general as stylistic rather than substantive, aimed at ending needless searches into the 
Statutes at Large, eliminating anachronistic provisions, and simplifying language.”). 
 25. Holtzoff, supra note 18, at 345. 
 26. William W. Barron, The Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 439, 441–43 (1949) (quoting 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19 (1924)). 
 27. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and 
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 44 (1947) 
(statement of John F. X. Finn, former special counsel to the House Committee on Revision of 
the Laws) (stating that he was “proudest of the way this proposed code deals with jurisdiction, 
venue, removal of causes, full faith and credit, and evidence and procedure”); see also Holtzoff, 
supra note 18, at 344–45 (describing the revised Judicial Code “[i]n its arrangement” as being 
“a considerable improvement on its predecessor”); Albert B. Maris, New Federal Judicial Code: 
Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable Gain, 34 A.B.A. J. 863, 864 (1948) (saying that “the 
revisers have been particularly successful in arranging, in a logical and consistent way, the 
statutory material which remains in force”). For further discussion of the deliberate structural 
changes introduced into the Judicial Code, see also infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 28. Susan S. McDonald, A Case of Statutory Misinterpretation: An 1839 Statute of 
Limitation on a Form of Debt Action is Being Misapplied to Limit Modern Regulatory 
Proceedings, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 659, 673 (2000). 
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Moreover, by this “regrouping of sections,” Congress was able to 
compare and reconcile “inconsistent or conflicting provisions that 
otherwise might pass unnoticed.”29 
William W. Barron, the chief reviser, explained that the Title 28 
revision brought about 
a consolidation of varied and scattered sections pertaining 
to similar subject matter, a logical, orderly grouping of 
related principles. While no change was made for the sake 
of change, we have made the effort, in the words of 
[Justice] Cardozo, “to reckon our gains and losses, strike a 
balance and start afresh.”30 
Importantly, notwithstanding § 33, Congress affirmatively enacted the 
revised Title 28 as an integrated whole—complete with parts, chapters, 
and subchapters—and thereby embedded a restructured Judicial Code 
into positive law.31 
Moreover, concerns about reading too much meaning into the 
structure of a revised and codified Title should be alleviated by the 
general presumption that changes made during a codification are for 
purposes of clarification, unless clear indication is present that a change 
in meaning was intended.32 To say that an inference of legislative intent 
may legitimately be drawn from the structure of a code is not to say that 
such an inference will in every case outweigh other textual and 
contextual indicia of statutory meaning.33 
In this respect, the primary information conveyed with clarity by the 
choice of organization within a code concerns the basic nature of a 
provision rather than its precise meaning in application.34 Thus, 
classification of a section within a particular chapter does say something 
important, but it does not say everything or even most things about a 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Barron, supra note 26, at 440. 
 30. Id. at 446 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 26, at 19). 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993) (saying about the 
“comprehensive revision of the Judicial Code completed in 1948, we do not presume that the 
revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law ‘unless an intent to make such [a] 
chang[e] is clearly expressed’” (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 
222, 227 (1957))); Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1912) (“The change 
of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section in two separated 
sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it will not be 
inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect 
unless such intention is clearly expressed.”); see generally 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28:11, at 493 (5th ed.) (noting the presumption that a change in 
language “is for purposes of clarity rather than for a change in meaning”). 
 33. See infra Part VI. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
8
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provision.35 And placement within a particular chapter certainly 
suggests nothing that may contradict the plain operating language of the 
section or that would preclude simultaneous and careful consideration 
by a court of the legislative history, contemporary legal understanding, 
and other commonly-invoked sources and canons regarding the 
meaning of a particular statutory provision. 
That consideration of structure, like every other rule or canon of 
statutory construction, is a tool of limited application is no reason to 
require a court to leave it in the tool-box when structure may be a useful 
guide to statutory understanding.36 By directing the courts not to give 
any meaning to parts, chapters, and catchlines, § 33 prevents courts 
from making a complete examination of a statutory section within the 
Judicial Code and from deriving every piece of information necessary to 
give faithful meaning to the enacted text.37 
III.   UNJUST AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS WHEN THE JUDICIARY IS 
SUPPOSEDLY BLINDED TO STATUTORY STRUCTURE: TWO CASE 
EXAMPLES 
Although § 33 of the 1948 Act codifying the Judicial Code38 r mains 
in force and has present-day practical effect,39 judges and lawyers have 
little awareness of this disruption to the ordinary practice of statutory 
interpretation.40 In the sixty years since the 1948 revision of Title 28, 
this uncodified constraint on judicial interpretation has been cited on 
only five occasions by federal courts at all levels—none later than 1958 
and only once by the Supreme Court.41 
In the single case in which the Supreme Court remarked on this 
provision, the structure of Title 28 would not have played a meaningful 
role in the Court’s decision, even if it had been adduced as evidence of 
legislative intent. In Ex parte Collett,42 the Court rejected the suggestion 
that the venue transfer statute applies only to civil suits for which 
special venue requirements were set out in neighboring provisions 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2008) 
(saying that while “a subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute,” 
that “[n]onetheless, statutory titles and section headings ‘are tools available for the resolution of 
a doubt about the meaning of a statute’” (citation omitted)). 
 37. See infra Part V. 
 38. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. 
 39. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 40. See infra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
 41. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 59 (1949); Steckel v. Lurie, 185 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 
1950); Hernandez v. Watson Bros. Trans. Co., 165 F. Supp. 720, 721 (D. Colo. 1958); Du Roure 
v. Alvord, 120 F. Supp. 166, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Boye v. United States, No. 07-195C, 2009 
WL 3824371, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 12, 2009). 
 42. 337 U.S. 55 (1949).  
9
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within the venue chapter of the Judicial Code.43 The Court mentioned 
§ 33 as disqualifying any argument based on placement of the venue 
transfer statute in this chapter.44 Nevertheless, the Court observed that 
the plain language of the statute, which authorizes transfer of “any civil 
action,” as well as the fact that other venue provisions in the chapter 
obviously apply generally to ordinary civil lawsuits, directed the 
result.45 Thus, even if evidence of structure had been admissible, it 
simply had little relevance in that case. 
Unfortunately, the parsity of citations to § 33 does not necessarily 
mean its practical effect is feeble. First, because a court may silently 
defer to § 33, the court may thereby dodge the question of whether the 
outcome would have been different had the court conscientiously 
interpreted the governing statutory provision within its structural 
context. While at least one case example of apparent avoidance is 
described below,46 we can never know on how many other occasions a 
statutory provision has been given an a-contextual and arguably 
mistaken reading because a federal court gave mute ascension to the 
congressional directive to ignore the structure of the Judicial Code. 
Second, whether by quiet circumvention or blissful ignorance, a court 
may interpret a section of the Judicial Code in a manner consistent with 
and informed by its structure, without ever acknowledging the contrary 
instruction of § 33.47 Unless the court references the Judicial Code 
framework by chapter and verse, the reader may not be certain whether 
structure played a crucial interpretive role in the outcome or whether the 
consistency of the judicial treatment of the section with that structure 
was serendipitous. 
That courts may sometimes depart from the command of § 33 and 
take the structure of the Judicial Code into account, while courts on 
other occasions may adhere to its confining injunction and refuse to 
consider structure, leaves litigants to the vagaries and injustice of 
discordant and capricious results. That questions implicating structure 
under the Judicial Code frequently involve jurisdictional versus 
procedural classifications means that an a-contextual interpretation may 






                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 58–59 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See infra Part III.A. 
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
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A.  Declining to Respect the Codification of the Statute of 
Limitations for the Court of Federal Claims in a  
Non-Jurisdictional Chapter 
The baneful effect of the blinding of the judiciary to manifest 
structural context within the Judicial Code was felt rather sharply in the 
Supreme Court’s recent 2008 decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States.48 As I have written previously, the John R. Sand case 
presented 
a question that seemingly only a lawyer could love (or care 
about): whether the statute of limitations governing non-
tort money claims against the federal government in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims is jurisdictional. In 
other words, is this an ordinary statute of limitations, that 
is, an affirmative defense and a procedural time constraint 
that may be waived or forfeited by the government? Or is 
this instead a special and absolute rule of subject matter 
jurisdiction, one that cannot be relinquished and indeed that 
must be raised by the court on its own motion, even if both 
the claimant and the government agree that the lawsuit was 
timely filed?49 
Yet the answer to the question of jurisdictionality in John R. Sand 
was anything but esoteric and abstract in its consequence. Categorizing 
a provision as jurisdictional or not determines whether the parties 
maintain control over what issues they choose to litigate, or instead 
whether a matter must be raised by the court sua sponte at each stage of 
the litigation, which in turn may mean that a decision on the merits may 
later be vacated, even if the parties had agreed that an element was 
satisfied.50 Moreover, the Supreme Court generally presumes that 
procedural rules in federal government cases, including the application 
of statutes of limitations to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, are 
to be applied in the same manner as with private litigants.51 But if what 
                                                                                                                     
 48. 552 U.S. 130 (2008). In the interests of full disclosure and because work on the case 
resulted in my first and consequential encounter with § 33, see infra notes 154–55 and 
accompanying text, I was co-counsel for the petitioner before the Supreme Court in this case. 
 49. Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 
50 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 517, 521 (2008). 
 50. See also infra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93–96 (1990) (holding that 
the limitations period on employment discrimination claims against the United States is subject 
to equitable tolling in the same manner as in cases among private litigants); Henderson v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 654, 663–71 (1996) (holding that service of process for claims against the 
federal government under the Suits in Admiralty Act may be accomplished under ordinary 
service provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding a stricter 
11
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appeared to be a procedural or case-processing rule is instead 
designated as jurisdictional, the general presumption of procedural 
custom is thereby rebutted. 
The petitioner in John R. Sand was not without forceful arguments 
against a jurisdictional reading of the statute of limitations at issue in 
that case.52 The statute of limitations for non-tort money claims in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims is found in § 2501 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code: “Every claim of which the United States Court 
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition 
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”53 The 
plain language suggests that the jurisdictional inquiry is to be separately 
completed before application of the time limitation. Jurisdiction is 
assumed in the first phrase of § 2501, before the time bar is set forth in 
the second phrase.54 When the predecessor statute was enacted in 1863, 
the legislative history indicated that members of Congress expected this 
statute of limitations to apply to the government in the same manner as 
to private parties.55 The contemporary legal understanding at the time of 
enactment was that a statute of limitations was a waivable defense.56 
                                                                                                                     
requirement under the statute). On application of procedural rules in federal government cases, 
see generally Sisk, supra note 49, at 580–87. 
 52. See generally Sisk, supra note 49, at 587–94 (developing in detail the arguments 
against characterization of § 2501 as jurisdictional). 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). 
 54. See Grass Valley Terrace v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 341, 347 (2005) (referring to 
this understanding as the “plain English interpretation of the statute”); see also John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“The text of the statute confirms that the limitations period is applied to claims of which the 
Court of Federal Claims already ‘has jurisdiction’”), aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); Howard 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1547, 1550 (2008) (saying that “properly read, [§ 2501] addresses the time for bringing 
claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of [Federal] Claims”). 
 55. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 414 (1863) (statement of Sen. Sherman) 
(“As this bill proposes to throw open this court to all claimants, I think the same statute of 
limitations ought to be applied to existing claims as would be applied between private 
individuals.”); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1860) (statement of Sen. Bayard) 
(justifying the inclusion of a statute of limitations “because there can be no reason whatever for 
acts of limitation as between citizen and citizen, . . . which does not apply as between 
Government and citizen”). Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the statute of 
limitations was intended to be jurisdictional in nature. 
 56. During the period when the 1863 statute of limitations was enacted, statutes of 
limitations were understood to affect the remedy and not the underlying right of action. 
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 624–29 (1885); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407, 
413 (1850); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327–28 (1839). See generally JOSEPH 
K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND 
ADMIRALTY  § 22, at 17 (4th ed. 1861). A statute of limitations thus has been a classic example 
of an affirmative defense left to the defendant to raise and establish and subject to waiver or 
forfeiture. See FED. R. CIV . P. 8(c) (listing “statute of limitations” as among the “affirmative 
defenses” that a defendant “must affirmatively state”); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 
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Congress had selected language from typical state statutes of limitations 
of this mid-nineteenth-century period, thus drafting § 2501 to be what 
the Supreme Court later called an “unexceptional” statute of 
limitations.57 
Indeed, in deciding the John R. Sand case, the Supreme Court 
disagreed with none of these points on their merits. Nonetheless, the 
Court ruled that the statute of limitations did have jurisdictional force, 
thus requiring a court to “raise on its own the timeliness of a lawsuit 
filed in the Court of Federal Claims, despite the Government’s waiver 
of the issue.”58 The Court’s decision was premised squarely and 
exclusively on stare decisis,59 adhering to a nineteenth century line of 
cases60 from a very early stage in the Court’s sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence that reflected a rigid jurisdictional attitude toward then-
novel legislation that afforded a general judicial remedy against the 
federal government for monetary claims.61 Two Justices dissented, 
agreeing both that the jurisdictional rule reaffirmed by the majority had 
been expressly abandoned in prior decisions and that any ambiguity in 
the case-law “ought to be resolved in favor of clarifying the law, rather 
than preserving an anachronism whose doctrinal underpinnings were 
discarded years ago.”62 
Due to § 33, the petitioner in John R. Sand was deprived of effective 
use of yet another powerful argument against implying jurisdiction into 
a statute of limitations, one based directly upon the structure of Title 28. 
Because the 1948 revision and codification of Title 28 post-dated the 
Court’s nineteenth century detour into jurisdictional analysis, this 
renewed legislative attention should have provided a basis for bringing 
                                                                                                                     
(2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no 
obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.”); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 
393 (1982) (stating that, rather than being “a jurisdictional prerequisite,” “a statute of 
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”). 
 57. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 145 (2002) (declaring 
unanimously—after re-examining the text and historical context of the predecessor statute—that 
§ 2501 is an “unexceptional” statute of limitations, comparable in text to “[a] number of 
contemporaneous [nineteenth century] state statutes of limitations applicable to suits between 
private parties”). 
 58. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008). 
 59. Id. at 132–40.  
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48, 50, 52 (1898) (declaring that the 
statute of limitations for the Court of Claims was “not merely a statute of limitations but also 
jurisdictional in its nature,” although the jurisdictional question was not presented because the 
government was openly challenging the timeliness of the action in the courts); Kendall v. United 
States, 107 U.S. 123, 124–25 (1883). 
 61. See Sisk, supra note 49, at 550–52, 592–94. 
 62. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 140–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the case law back onto the original path set by Congress.63 Section 33, 
however, drained persuasive force away from this structural argument. 
When we examine the jurisdictional and procedural statutes 
applicable to the Court of Federal Claims by how they were classified 
into specific statutory parts and chapters by Congress in the 1948 
codification of Title 28, the structural framework of the Judicial Code 
strongly suggests that the statute of limitations did not limit the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the court. 
In its revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, Congress 
reserved the fourth part for provisions on federal courts jurisdiction and 
venue: “Part IV—Jurisdiction and Venue.” Chapter 91 of that part, 
titled “United States Court of Federal Claims,” now contains sixteen 
sections expressly defining and limiting the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. Nearly all the sections in Chapter 91 speak forthrightly in 
the language of “jurisdiction.”64 Thus, when Congress wishes to grant 
or withhold “jurisdiction” from the Court of Federal Claims, its choice 
of both text and code classification in this chapter of Title 28 shows that 
it knows how to do so in the most distinctive terms and by clear 
structural organization. 
                                                                                                                     
 63. As part of the 1948 Act, a slight change was made in the language of the statute of 
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, substituting the words “has jurisdiction” for “cognizable by” in 
describing the claims falling within the authority of the Court of Federal Claims. The 1863 
predecessor statute read: “[E]very claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of 
claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed 
in the court or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act within six years after the claim 
first accrues.” Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767. As currently codified, the 
statute speaks of the Court of Federal Claims as having “jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). 
The word “cognizable” means “‘within [the] jurisdiction of [a] court or power given to [a] court 
to adjudicate [a] controversy.’” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (quoting BLACK ’ S 
LAW DICTIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990)). In John R. Sand & Gravel Co., the Court said that it 
would not presume this revision worked a change in the substantive law without a clear 
expression by Congress. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 134–36 (majority opinion). As 
neither party suggested that “has jurisdiction” and “cognizable by” were anything other than 
synonymous, the Court unsurprisingly found “no such expression of intent here[]” to change the 
meaning based solely on its text. Id at 136. By contrast, after briefing by the parties regarding 
§ 33, the Court chose not to address the classification of the statute of limitations into a 
procedural chapter in the 1948 revision. 
 64. Most of the sections in this chapter state that “[t]he United States Court of Federal 
Claims shall have jurisdiction” over a defined claim or set of claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1494–
97, 1499, 1503, 1505, 1507–08. A few sections state that “[t]he United States Court of Federal 
Claims shall not have jurisdiction” over a defined set of other claims. Id. §§ 1500–02, 1509. 
There are only two exceptions to this pattern of language expressly granting or withholding 
“jurisdiction.” First, the unique provision for congressional reference of claims to the Court of 
Federal Claims, id. § 1492, does not speak in jurisdictional terms because it does not grant 
jurisdiction as such. Second, the provision waiving sovereign immunity for claims alleging 
infringement of patents and copyrights by the United States, id. § 1498, confers jurisdiction by 
creating an exclusive action in the Court of Federal Claims. 
14
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By contrast, § 2501,65 as the general statute of limitations for claims 
before the Court of Federal Claims, is codified in a separate part of Title 
28 titled “Part VI—Particular Proceedings” and in Chapter 165 titled 
“United States Court of Federal Claims Procedure.” In addition to 
setting the time for filing suit, the sections in this chapter address such 
procedural, non-jurisdictional matters as aliens’ privilege to sue;66 
appearance of parties before the court, presentation of evidence, 
examination of witnesses, rules of practice and procedure, and holding 
trials;67 the qualifications of witnesses;68 discovery;69 new trials and 
stays of judgment;70 payment of judgments;71 and the conclusiveness of 
judgments.72 None of the provisions in Chapter 165 speak in the 
language of “jurisdiction”—except to confirm the court’s previous 
exercise of or the availability of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim to which the court is to apply the procedural rule.73 
Accordingly, the designation of § 2501 within a procedural chapter 
as enacted by Congress in the 1948 revision should have confirmed that 
this was indeed an ordinary and unexceptional statute of limitations that 
should be construed and applied according to common legal standards. 
Even the government, in its brief before the Supreme Court in Joh R. 
Sand, acknowledged that given the deliberate structural arrangement of 
Title 28, it is likely that the 1948 code “revisers did not understand the 
preexisting six-year filing requirement to be a limit on the Court of 
Claims’ jurisdiction.”74 
But none of that mattered. Through § 33, Congress had effectively 
instructed the courts to ignore this organization and classification. And 
the  Supreme Court apparently obliged. 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. § 2501. 
 66. Id. § 2502. 
 67. Id. § 2503. 
 68. Id. § 2506. 
 69. Id. § 2507. 
 70. Id. § 2515. 
 71. Id. § 2517. 
 72. Id. § 2519. 
 73. See id. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has 
jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim 
first accrues.”) (emphasis added); id. § 2502(a) (“Citizens or subjects of any foreign government 
which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their 
government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims 
if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court’s jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added); 
id. § 2510(a) (“The Comptroller General may transmit to the United States Court of Federal 
Claims for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of which the Court of Federal Claims 
might take jurisdiction . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 74. Brief for the United States at 34, John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130 (2008) 
(No. 06-1164). 
15
Sisk: Lifting the Blindfold from Lady Justice: Allowing Judges to See t
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
472 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
B.  Honoring the Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional 
Classification of Statutory Sections in the Federal Tort Claims Act 
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)75 is the most comprehensive 
and commonly invoked waiver of federal sovereign immunity for tort 
claims against the federal government.76 Under the FTCA, the United 
States is liable on the same basis and to the same extent as recovery 
would be allowed for a tort committed under like circumstances by a 
private person in that state.77 
While the FTCA waives the federal sovereign immunity for tort 
claims generally, the United States remains the beneficiary of several 
special rules and protections, notably including: restrictions on the 
standards of liability (such as the exclusion of strict liability);78 
numerous defined exceptions to liability that bar certain types of claims 
(such as claims for assault, libel, misrepresentation, and interference 
with contract)79 or that preclude liability arising out of certain 
governmental activities (including discretionary or policymaking 
functions,80 transmission of mail,81 and military combat);82 restrictions 
on damages available (precluding prejudgment interest and punitive 
damages);83 and the exclusion of certain categories of people from 
eligibility to seek a damages remedy under the FTCA (federal civilian 
employees covered by a compensation act84 and military service 
members injured incident to service).85 
In FDIC v. Meyer,86 the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Federal Tort Claims Act superseded another statute that generally 
permits a particular agency to sue and be sued. By express statutory 
directive, the FTCA is the exclusive venue for suits against agencies 
that are authorized to sue and be sued in their own name if the claim is 
                                                                                                                     
 75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2006). 
 76. GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 3.02, at 104 (4th ed. 
2006). 
 77. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). 
 78. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 797–803 (1972) (construing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1), making the government liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of 
any government employee, as encompassing only fault-based causes of action, such as 
negligence or intentional wrongdoing). 
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
 80. Id. § 2680(a). 
 81. Id. § 2680(c). 
 82. Id. § 2680(j). 
 83. Id. § 2674. 
 84. Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006). 
 85. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–46 (1950) (holding that claims by 
military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service should be excluded from the FTCA). 
 86. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
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“cognizable” under the FTCA.87 Defining “cognizable” as meaning that 
a claim is within the adjudicative authority of a court, the Court ruled 
that the “inquiry focuses on the jurisdictional grant provided by 
§ 1346(b).”88 
Subsection 1346(b) not only speaks in the language of jurisdiction 
but also is codified in Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code, which bears the 
legend “District Courts; Jurisdiction.” Focusing on this section, the 
Supreme Court in Meyer described the jurisdictional directions for 
FTCA claims: 
Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts 
jurisdiction over a certain category of claims for which the 
United States has waived its sovereign immunity and 
“render[ed]” itself liable. This category includes claims that 
are: 
“[1] against the United States, [2] for money 
damages, . . . [3] for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government [5] while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment, [6] under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would 
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law 
of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—
and thus is “cognizable” under § 1346(b)—if it is 
actionable under § 1346(b). And a claim is 
actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six 
elements outlined above.89 
Accordingly, as confirmed by its jurisdictional language and its 
location within a jurisdictional chapter of the Judicial Code, § 1346(b) 
demarks the jurisdictional compass of federal court authority over tort 
claims against the United States, setting forth six requisite jurisdictional 
elements. Thus, for example, whether a government employee was 
“acting within the scope of his . . . employment,” and whether the 
“circumstances” are such that a “private person” would be liable are 
                                                                                                                     
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). 
 88. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476. 
 89. 510 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 
140–41 (1950) (describing § 1346(b) as conferring jurisdiction, while regarding other provisions 
in the FTCA as prescribing what claims are allowable, to be determined by courts in exercising 
that jurisdiction). 
17
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jurisdictional questions that must be satisfactorily answered before the 
court has the authority to adjudicate the claim.90 
By contrast, the remaining statutory sections that comprise the 
FTCA are located in a separate chapter of the Judicial Code, namely 
Chapter 171 which is designated “Tort Claims Procedure.” By virtue of 
being classified in a non-jurisdictional chapter, and even more 
specifically in a chapter that is reserved for standards and rules of 
“procedure,” these additional statutory provisions presumably should 
not be given a jurisdictional construction. Thus, while §§ 2671 through 
2680 of the FTCA91 set forth additional standards, prerequisites, 
directions, and exceptions which are enforceable expressions of 
legislative intent, the presence or absence of these elements generally 
does not have a jurisdictional effect so as to deprive the court of any 
authority to proceed. If the parties should stipulate to or waive 
objections respecting these elements, the action could proceed without 
the court being obliged to act sua sponte to ensure that each provision 
was satisfied. 
And, indeed, the courts appear to have arrived at just that conclusion 
about the distribution of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional elements 
in the FTCA, although without directly referencing the chapter structure 
of the Judicial Code in doing so. Thus, for example, § 2674 of the 
FTCA92 more specifically describes the standard of liability and adds 
exclusions of governmental liability for “interest prior to judgment” and 
“for punitive damages.” When the Supreme Court construed this 
prohibition on awards of punitive damages in Molzof v. United States,93 
it rejected the government’s suggestion of a special definition that 
would limit governmental liability to strictly compensatory damages, 
instead adopting the traditional common-law understanding of punitive 
damages as that which is designed to punish a party for egregious 
misconduct.94 In relying on ordinary principles of statutory 
construction, rather than applying the kind of strict and jurisdictional 
construction often applied to the core of a statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity,95 the Court rejected the government’s “restrictive reading of 
the statute.”96 In fact, after quoting the punitive damages limitation as 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
 91. Id. §§ 2671–80. 
 92. Id. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title 
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive 
damages.”). 
 93. 502 U.S. 301 (1992). 
 94. Id. at 304–12. 
 95. See Sisk, supra note 49, at 562–66. 
 96. Molzof, 502 U.S. at 310. 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/4
2010] LIFTING THE BLINDFOLD FROM LADY JUSTICE 475 
 
found in § 2674, the Court referred to the “jurisdictional grant over 
FTCA cases” as being separately found in § 1346(b).97 
Similarly, with respect to the exceptions to liability under the FTCA 
found in § 2680,98 in Indian Towing Co. v. United States99 and Block v. 
Neal,100 the Supreme Court noted the government’s concessions that the 
discretionary function exception101 did not apply in these cases—
waivers the Court did not question as it would have been obliged to do 
sua sponte were it a jurisdictional element. 
In the recent Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service decision,102 the Court 
explained that it was inclined to construe exceptions to the waiver more 
narrowly, so as not to defeat the sweeping purpose of the FTCA in 
waiving sovereign immunity.103 If these standards, restrictions, or 
exceptions were instead jurisdictional limitations, the presumption 
would be in the other direction, as the burden lies with the party seeking 
to invoke the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.104 
For comparative purposes, special attention should be drawn to the 
statute of limitations governing FTCA claims. The limitations period is 
not established through the general section waiving sovereign immunity 
and simultaneously conferring district court jurisdiction105 nor in any 
other section classified in a jurisdictional chapter of the Judicial Code. 
Rather, § 2401(b)106 is located in Chapter 161 of Title 28, which is 
headed “United States as Party Generally.” In language with significant 
parallels to the statute of limitations for non-tort money claims in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims,107 Subsection 2401(b) provides: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Id. at 305. 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 2680. 
 99. 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955). 
 100. 460 U.S. 289, 294 (1983). 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 102. 546 U.S. 481 (2006). 
 103. Id. at 491–92; see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) 
(saying that the Court has “narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity 
where that was consistent with Congress’ clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping 
language’ of the Federal Tort Claims Act”). 
 104. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) (“[I]f a plaintiff’s allegations of 
jurisdictional facts are challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of supporting 
the allegations by competent proof.”); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 
(1941) (“[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal 
courts is one calling for the strict construction of [the statute allowing removal of cases from 
state to federal court].”); Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883) (“[T]he 
presumption is that a cause [brought in federal court] is without its jurisdiction unless the 
contrary affirmatively appears.”). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
 106. Id. § 2401(b). 
 107. Id. § 2501; see supra Part III.A. 
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A tort claim against the United States shall be forever 
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate 
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or 
unless action is begun within six months after . . . notice of 
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was 
presented.108 
Although previously describing this FTCA statute of limitations as a 
“condition of [the] waiver” of sovereign immunity,109 the Supreme 
Court has never characterized it as jurisdictional nor addressed the 
question of whether it is subject to equitable tolling. Reasoning that the 
FTCA contains “a garden variety limitations provision,”110 nearly every 
court of appeals to address the question has concluded or suggested that 
the FTCA provision falls within the presumption of Irwin v. Department 
of Veterans Affairs111 that statutes of limitations in federal government 
cases are subject to equitable tolling.112 As “[t]he sine qua non of a 
jurisdictional rule is a demand for strict and nonwaivable compliance 
with its terms,”113 whatever label the courts might apply to the 
provision, a holding that the FTCA statute of limitations may be 
equitably adjusted confirms its non-jurisdictional nature.114 
                                                                                                                     
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
 109. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979). 
 110. Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 111. 498 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1990). 
 112. See, e.g., T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2006); 
Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2006); Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d 
272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Perez, 167 F.3d at 917; Glarner v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30 
F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); Pipkin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274–75 (10th Cir. 
1991); see also Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that strict 
compliance with FTCA statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional prerequisite). But see Marley 
v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding, with reliance on John R. 
Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130 (2008), that the FTCA statute of limitations is jurisdictional 
and that the doctrines of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling do not apply); Wukawitz v. 
United States, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Utah 2001) (holding that Congress did not intend 
to permit equitable tolling of the FTCA statute of limitations); Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, 
Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Putting the Legislative History in 
Proper Perspective, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 174 (2000) (arguing that the legislative history of 
the FTCA indicates Congress did not intend the statute of limitations to be subject to equitable 
exceptions); Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (1999) (same). 
 113. Sisk, supra note 49, at 554. 
 114. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (holding that “the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement,” meaning that the “Court has no 
authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”); Zipes v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (noting that “filing a timely charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, 
like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”); Scott Dodson, 
In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 60 (2008) (“Defects in subject matter 
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None of the court decisions declining to confer jurisdictional 
significance or effect on the substantive standards, the exceptions to 
liability, and the statute of limitations to the FTCA has expressly cited 
the placement of these provisions in non-jurisdictional chapters of Title 
28. Yet, recalling the  Supreme Court’s drawing of the jurisdictional 
line through the six elements found in the one statutory section that is 
classified in a jurisdictional chapter and appreciating the court rulings 
that decline to categorize as jurisdictional the various other statutory 
provisions which are not codified in a jurisdictional chapter, the results 
rather neatly track the framework of Title 28. This may simply be a 
coincidence, or it may be adequately explained by the clear use of 
jurisdictional language in § 1346(b) and the absence of such language in 
other FTCA sections. Still, one might be forgiven for suspecting that 
some judges may have peeked at the structure of the Judicial Code in 
making decisions classifying the basic nature of these statutory 
provisions. 
In any event, the very same arguments based upon both language 
and structure should apply with full force to the statute of limitations for 
non-tort money claims against the federal government that are brought 
in the Court of Federal Claims.115 Instead, giving rise to an anomaly in 
the law and disharmony with code structure, similarly worded statutes 
of limitations that are both codified in non-jurisdictional chapters have 
been given contradictory readings. This disparate treatment could and 
should be avoided by encouraging the courts in every case to give heed 
to the structure of the Judicial Code. 
IV.   SUBVERTING FAITHFUL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
STATUTORY LAW 
On at least some occasions, the courts appear to have heard and 
heeded the call of § 33 to ignore the structure of the Judicial Code.116 
Still, might there be a plausible basis for urging the courts instead to 
ignore § 33? Or, more in keeping with the principle of judicial 
candor,117 might the courts have a legitimate basis for forthrightly 
refusing to listen to § 33? If § 33 either fails to clearly limit the 
judiciary’s choices among the available tools of statutory construction 
or improperly constrains the courts or the legislature in performance of 
their constitutional responsibilities, then it may be nullified without the 
need for affirmative legislative annulment. 
                                                                                                                     
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited, waived, or consented to; they are not subject to principles of 
estoppel; and they can be raised at any time and by any party, including a court sua sponte.”). 
 115. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006); see also supra Part III.A. 
 116. See supra Part III. 
 117. See infra note 164. 
21
Sisk: Lifting the Blindfold from Lady Justice: Allowing Judges to See t
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
478 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
First, § 33 of the 1948 Act instructs the reader that “[n]o inference of 
a legislative construction is to be drawn” by reason of the chapters and 
catchlines that form the framework of the Judicial Code.118 An 
ingenious exponent might insist that this interpretive directive is without 
functional efficacy because it aims at the wrong target, that is, it speaks 
to an assessment of legislative intent rather than a judicial interpretation 
of the authoritative text. Taking literally its prohibition of reliance on 
structure as a basis for drawing an “inference of legislative 
construction,” § 33 arguably fails to circumscribe the textualist judge 
who focuses upon the language enacted by Congress and has no interest 
in divining the underlying legislative intent.119 As the nation’s most 
prominent textualist jurist, Justice Antonin Scalia, puts it, the judge 
should decide “on the basis of what the legislature said,” rather than “on 
the basis of what [the legislature] meant.”120 In the instance of the 
Judicial Code, what Congress “said” is to be found in both the phrasing 
of individual statutory sections and the wording of parts and chapters 
and catchlines. In sum, because a textualist jurist draws no “inference of 
legislative construction” whatsoever, the argument could be made that 
§ 33’s attempt to regulate how judges ascertain legislative intent is a 
misdirected nullity.121 
But this dismissal of § 33 as an empty gesture might fairly be 
characterized as too clever by half. Precisely because such a reading of 
§ 33 would deprive language enacted by Congress of having any 
consequence, the textualist judge who sidestepped this provision 
arguably would contradict his or her own text-focused theory of 
judging. As William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett 
ask, “[i]f the statutory text tells the judge to follow legislative intent, 
what is the textualist to do?”122 And, of course, a judge who did not 
strictly adhere to a textualist approach to statutory interpretation would 
not blanch at the statutory reference to “legislative construction” (even 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. 
 119. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (1997) (arguing that the judge should 
focus upon the text of the statute—“what the lawgiver promulgated”—rather than seek to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature—“what the lawgiver meant”); John F. Manning, Textualism 
as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684 (1997) (citing Max Radin’s 
“compelling indictment of legislative intent” as a basis for statutory interpretation, including the 
argument that “a search for legislative intent is futile”). 
 120. Scalia, supra note 119, at 18. 
 121. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &  ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 955 (4th ed. 2007) 
(posing the question of how a judicial textualist, such as Justice Scalia, should respond to 
interpretive directives that contradict the textualist premises for appropriate interpretation of a 
statute). 
 122. Id. 
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if that judge found this particular directive to be disquieting for other 
reasons). 
Moreover, despite the quaint parlance of “inference of legislative 
construction,” the meaning of § 33 is clear in forbidding interpretive 
reliance upon the structure and labeling of the Judicial Code. Thus, 
whatever the respective merits of a textualist versus an intentionlist (or 
other) approach to statutory interpretation in general, this particular 
interpretive directive can be implemented, if awkwardly for other 
reasons, without engaging in any subjective inquiry into legislative 
intent. 
Second, the discomfort that a judge might experience in obeying a 
statutory directive that demands deliberate disregard for a visible part of 
the legislative product could be the symptom of other and more 
fundamental infirmities in § 33. Does § 33 trespass on the constitutional 
responsibilities of the Judicial Branch in faithful interpretation of 
statutory law or interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of the 
Legislative Branch in exercising its powers without being regulated by 
the dead hand of prior legislative actors? 
The traditional and majority view among scholars is that “Congress 
has the constitutional power to adopt interpretive instructions for courts’ 
use in interpretation.”123 In a comprehensive analysis of the question, 
Nicholas Rosenkranz concludes that, with exceptions where a particular 
provision overrides constitutional default rules demanding a clear 
legislative statement or prospectively delegates legislative power to 
define statutory terms, “[m]ost of the interpretive decisions courts 
make—whether choosing a dictionary, referencing a canon, or spurning 
pre-enactment legislative history—may be regulated by Congress.”124 
Indeed, Rosenkranz opines that the legislative power to issue 
instructions to the courts on how to interpret statutes “is an 
exceptionally potent one.”125 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response 
and Proposal to Nicholas Rosenkranz’s Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 571, 591 (2004); see also 1A SINGER, supra note 32, § 27:4, at 473 (“There should be no 
question that an interpretive clause operating prospectively is within legislative power.”); 
Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the 
Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 448 (1950) (“Any serious suggestion at this day that since 
interpretation is a judicial function a general interpretive act, applicable only to future statutes, 
would be unconstitutional, could hardly be taken seriously.”). 
 124. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2140 (2002); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System 
of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1502 (2000) (“Congress makes the laws that the 
courts must apply, and it is appropriate for Congress, as for any giver of binding instructions, to 
give instructions about how those who must carry out the instructions should understand them.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 125. Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2140. 
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But other scholarly voices have been raised in dissent against the 
conventional wisdom. Drawing upon Marbury v. Madison’s venerable 
principle that it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is,”126 these scholars argue that “[t]he legislature has 
the power to make the laws, while the judiciary declares what those 
laws mean.”127 Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash contend that 
“[b]ecause the lodestar of statutory interpretation is the discernment of 
the statute’s meaning, binding rules of interpretation of whatever sort 
must be ignored when an interpreter decides that the meaning of a 
statute differs from the constructed ‘meaning’ derived from the 
application of binding rules of construction.”128 Linda Jellum concludes 
that, while “[t]he legislature may legitimately try to influence the 
interpretive outcome to promote specific policy choices,” the 
Legislative Branch would violate separation of powers principles by 
“attempting to control the interpretive process.”129 In particular, Jellum 
argues that an interpretive directive crosses the constitutional line and 
invades the judicial territory when it seeks to “identify what evidence a 
court may consider when interpreting statutes”130 (a negative conclusion 
that presumably would encompass a directive that the judiciary may not 
consider the “evidence” of code structure when giving meaning to a 
statutory section).131 
In addition to creating a potential collision with the judiciary’s duty 
of faithful interpretation of statutes, the binding effect of prospective 
interpretive rules on future Congresses may invalidly constrict the free 
exercise of the constitutional legislative power. Laurence Tribe argues 
that Congress may not limit the effect of statutes enacted in the future or 
require future Congresses to use certain language to accomplish a 
legislative purpose.132 Relying “upon the limiting provisions” of such 
statutes “restrictively to construe a statute that other interpretive indicia, 
                                                                                                                     
 126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803). 
 127. Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 
221 (1994). 
 128. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory 
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMM. 97, 99–100 (2003). 
 129. Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When 
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 840 (2009). 
 130. Id. at 882. 
 131. See id. at 849 (listing “components” of a statute, including “titles,” as falling into the 
“intrinsic” category of sources of meaning for statutes). 
 132. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3, at 125–26 n.1 (3d ed. 
2000); see also Alexander & Prakash, supra note 128, at 105 (“Congress may not force a future 
Congress to use particular language to legislate. If a meaning emerges from a statute, that 
meaning must control, rather than some artificial meaning that emerges from an inflexible 
adherence to rule of interpretation promulgated by a prior Congress.”). 
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taken as a whole, suggest is best read” to mean something different, 
Tribe argues, “would seem to raise serious constitutional questions.”133 
As most of the constitutional objections to statutory interpretive 
directions have focused on those that operate prospectively and thus 
purport to dictate the meaning of statutes enacted by future Congresses, 
even some scholars raising constitutional questions concede that 
“Congress could enact mandatory rules of interpretation that are to 
apply to the very act which created the mandatory rules of 
interpretation.”134 However, an interpretive directive that is attached to 
the codification of a title of the United States Code, which will be the 
subject of dynamic ongoing modification across the decades,135 i  
difficult to classify into a single retrospective or prospective category. 
More pointedly, § 33 is not a typical interpretive directive that 
forthrightly defines a term, establishes a presumption, or sets out a tie-
breaking rule of construction to be used when the text of the underlying 
statute fails to provide a clear answer in a particular case. As Alan 
Romero reports, “[v]irtually all interpretive directions apply only when 
a statute is ambiguous and needs to be interpreted.”136 The defense of 
interpretive instructions against the argument that they “impinge on the 
federal judiciary’s interpretive power” is most trenchant when such 
provisions are understood as “designed solely to clarify potential 
ambiguities in the law.”137 Section 33, however, does not modestly 
certify a particular canon of interpretation to be employed when the text 
is ambiguous. Rather, § 33 commands the courts to elide part of the 
statutory text itself. 
In 1948, when Congress passed Title 28 into positive law, it 
promulgated not only the wording of each individual provision but also 
                                                                                                                     
 133. 1 TRIBE, supra note 132, at 125. But see Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2117–18 
(saying the “simple answer” to Tribe’s objection is that a rule of statutory construction does not 
add to the constitutional requirements for a future Congress to enact legislation “because the 
rule itself may be suspended or repealed by an act that comports with Article I, Section 7”); 
Siegel, supra note 124, at 1504 n.235 (arguing that “the legislature, in passing any statute, may 
always exclude it from the operation of any previously passed interpretive statute,” so an 
interpretative statute does “not really detract from the legislature’s power”). 
 134. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 128, at 98 n.2. 
 135. On the frequency of amendments by Congress to Title 28, see infra note 164–65 and 
accompanying text.  
 136. Romero, supra note 127, at 228; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 
183–84 (1993) (holding that the interpretive clause directing that the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) be given a “liberal construction” does not substitute for “the 
normal means of interpretation” but “only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity” (internal 
quotations and citation omitted)); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the 
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 245 (1996) (explaining generally that “the plain meaning of the statute 
provides a check on the use of [interpretive] canon[s]” by the courts). 
 137. See Kiracofe, supra note 123, at 596. 
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the designated parts, chapters, and subchapters into which those 
provisions were located.138 The visible body of the Judicial Code is not 
something outside of the text but rather is composed of a lexical spine to 
which every section of Title 28 is joined. The arrangement of parts, 
chapters, and subchapters is marked by black lettering and is carried out 
by words, no less than the content of the particular statutory sections 
that are assembled within that textual architecture. Thus, strictly 
speaking, judicial attention to the structure of the Judicial Code does not 
involve the mere application of a canon of construction but rather is part 
and parcel of the primary interpretive focus upon the text itself.139 
Now Congress certainly could codify a title of the United States 
Code without arranging sections within parts, chapters, and subchapters, 
and eschewing any catchline appellation, which plainly would preclude 
any interpretive exercise based upon structure. That Congress 
theoretically could enact a code as a hodgepodge of provisions 
assembled at random, however, is no answer to the straightforward 
observation that Congress did something quite different with the 
revision and codification of Title 28. Nonetheless, one still might 
suggest, Congress surely could codify a statutory title that was 
structured in a particular manner for the convenience of the legislators 
during their consideration, while directing that this framework was not 
to be enacted into law. Indeed, § 33 might be defended as simply 
accomplishing that modest purpose of demoting the structure of the 
Judicial Code to something less than the force of law. 
But, again, the constitutionally-salient fact remains that Congress 
chose to instantiate the structure of the Judicial Code into the law when 
codifying Title 28. The 1948 legislation that enacted Title 28 into 
positive law—the act which “passed the House of Representatives and 
the Senate” and was “presented to the President of the United States” 
pursuant to Article I, § 7 of the Constitution140—consisted of a Judicial 
Code that was divided into parts, chapters, and subchapters and that 
bore headings for divisions and sections.141 Thus, within the meaning of 
Article I, § 7, the whole of Title 28, including its lexical structure, 
became “a Law.”142 The constitutional question then becomes whether 
Congress may extract a promise from the judiciary to avert the juridical 
eye from part of the completed legislative action. 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. 
 139. See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 644–45 (1990) (explaining that 
“basic principles of statutory construction . . . require giving effect to the meaning and 
placement of the words chosen by Congress” (emphasis added)). 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 141. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. 
 142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (declaring the legislative actions that create “a Law”). 
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To again quote Justice Scalia, “[t]he text is the law, and it is the text 
that must be observed.”143 Even assuming the general constitutional 
validity of statutory interpretive directions, no regulation of the courts 
may “undermine the essential functions of the judiciary.”144 By 
directing the interpreter to disregard part of the “Law,” § 33 may 
simultaneously contribute to the constitutional delinquency of the 
Legislative Branch by allowing it to disavow its own legislative act and 
commit a constitutional trespass against the Judicial Branch by 
interrupting the conscientious exercise of “[t]he judicial Power of the 
United States.”145 
Nor can an interpretive provision attached to an act of Congress 
serve to undo what Congress through the main body of the same act has 
manifestly done. If dissatisfied with the structure of a code, Congress 
may subsequently repeal it, thereby erasing it from the United States 
Code. Congress may not, however, simultaneously enact and repeal the 
same line of text through a single legislative act, for such an internal 
inconsistency would abrogate the very law-creating character of the act. 
Even if such an oxymoron could qualify as a proper exercise of the 
legislative power, § 33 does not purport to negate or withdraw any part 
of the enactment. Rather, § 33 seeks to veil part of the legislative action 
in darkness, with instructions to the courts not to shine a light on to 
what Congress has done. 
In the end, we return to the inescapable fact that Congress’s 
organization and classification of statutory provisions into designated 
parts and chapters within a newly-codified Title 28 was anything but 
accidental. As discussed previously and as is further emphasized below, 
the Title 28 revisers in drafting the revision and codification and the 
Congress in then enacting the legislation did not regard the structure of 
the Judicial Code as merely ornamental and without substantive import 
for the public.146 Quite to the contrary, the coherent and organized 
treatment of jurisdiction, venue, removal of causes, full faith and credit, 
and evidence and procedure were proudly highlighted as among the 
great successes of the revision. And, again, when Congress took final 
action on the legislation to revise and codify Title 28, it did not leave 
behind the structure of the Judicial Code, as mere scaffolding to be 
broken down after construction, but rather cemented the entire 
integrated compilation into positive law. 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Scalia, supra note 119, at 22. 
 144. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 
728 (2007). 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 146. See supra notes 21, 27–31 and accompanying text, and infra notes 152, 173–75 and 
accompanying text. 
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In any event, the maladroit “inference of legislative construction” 
language in § 33 and the constitutional dubiety of a legislative attempt 
to blind the eyes of the judiciary to a central element of what Congress 
has enacted should prompt us to question the wisdom of the provision 
as a matter of policy. Whatever the constitutional strengths or defects of 
interpretive directives generally or this provision specifically, scholars 
agree that Congress always remains free to unburden itself of a prior 
directive that it concludes no longer serves the public interest.147 
Textually ambiguous or not, constitutionally valid or not, § 33 should be 
repealed.148 
V.  MAKING THE CASE FOR REPEAL OF LEGISLATION THAT BLINDS 
THE COURTS TO STRUCTURAL REALITY  
Section 33 of the 1948 revision and codification of Title 28 instructs 
the courts to ignore what a simple reading of the table of contents to the 
Judicial Code makes readily apparent.149 By denying that any meaning 
may be attached to the structure of the Code, § 33 not only withdraws 
an important tool of statutory construction from the judiciary’s tool-box, 
but undermines the rule of law by blinding the judiciary to the black-
and-white format of Title 28, as enacted into positive law.150 
Whatever uneasiness Congress may have harbored in 1948 that 
caused it to divert judicial attention from the very structural revisions 
Congress was enacting Title 28 to produce,151 there is no apparent 
contemporary reason to preserve the false directive of § 33. For at least 
two reasons, this pernicious provision should be repealed. 
First, § 33 is dishonest legislation, or at least misleading, because it 
surreptitiously rewrites Title 28 of the United States Code to erase the 
palpable organization that is manifest to any reader. Judge Albert Maris 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, who had 
been appointed by Chief Justice Stone to chair the committee of the 
Judicial Conference working with Congress on the Title 28 revision, 
observed later that same year after the 1948 enactment: 
A glance at the new Act will demonstrate that the revisers 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 132, § 2-3, at 125 (“[T]he power of Congress l gislatively to 
bind subsequent Congresses is limited, for any statute that purported to direct or to forbid 
subsequent Congresses to do certain things or to follow certain procedures could be repealed, as 
could any other law, by another duly enacted statute.”); Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 2120 
(arguing that the answer to any objections about the constitutional validity of statutory 
interpretive directions is that a current Congress always may exercise the legislative power to 
repeal the acts of prior Congresses). 
 148. See infra Part V. 
 149. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991. 
 150. See also supra Part IV. 
 151. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. 
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have been particularly successful in arranging, in a logical 
and consistent way, the statutory material which remains in 
force. The law has been made easily accessible, not only to 
the lawyer, but to the layman as well.152 
While a “glance” at Title 28 does indeed demonstrate a “logical and 
consistent” arrangement of the statutory material, § 33 cloaks the 
brightly-lit profile observed by both the lawyer and layman in 
jurisprudential darkness. 
In this respect, § 33 foments a paradoxical form of artifice, because 
it effectively declares that the visible structure of Title 28 is only an 
illusion and is without meaning, while the classification of statutory 
provisions into sections that are collected with related provisions into 
carefully designed and described chapters remains immediately and 
obviously apparent to any reader of the legal text. In truth, and 
notwithstanding § 33, this comprehensive statutory framework was 
painstakingly and deliberately constructed by the 1948 code revisers 
and was then enacted by Congress as positive law, as the previous 
discussion confirms.153 Thus, with one legislative action (the enactment 
of Title 28 with a plain and visible structure), Congress says one thing, 
but with another (the veiling directive of § 33), Congress says another. 
Especially because it is an uncodified provision, § 33 is likely to be 
overlooked even by a reasonably diligent legal researcher. Of the many 
scholars in the fields of federal courts and civil procedure who reviewed 
a draft of this Article or with whom I have discussed this matter, most 
of whom have an encyclopedic knowledge of the Judicial Code, nearly 
all acknowledged that they too had not previously known of the 
existence of § 33. Despite toiling in the vineyard of the Judicial Code 
for twenty years as a practitioner, teacher, and scholar, when I began 
work on the opening brief for the petitioner before the  Supreme Court 
in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,154 I failed to discover 
this codicil to the 1948 revision until my co-counsel, Jeffrey Haynes, 
brought to our attention the results of his diligent research. 
Both to avoid being embarrassed by having failed to mention this 
uncodified provision, should the government’s counsel uncover it and 
invoke it in the respondent’s brief, and because we were ethically 
obliged to bring mandatory authority to the attention of the Supreme 
Court,155 we forthrightly surfaced § 33 in our brief. In so doing, we 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Maris, supra note 27, at 864; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1–2 (1948) (“The 
statutory material presently in force has been arranged in the bill in a logical and consistent way, 
rendering it easily ascertainable.”). 
 153. See supra Parts III & IV. 
 154. See supra Part III.A. 
 155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002) (saying the lawyer “shall 
not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
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realized that § 33 unavoidably withdrew some of the persuasive power 
from our structural argument and forced us to frame this point as a 
species of a textual argument based on comparison of the differing 
language of statutory sections in different chapters of Title 28. My 
guess is that most advocates would have overlooked § 33 and made the 
structural argument without qualification, either improperly or to their 
chagrin when opposing counsel or the Court adduced it. 
In sum, § 33 sets up the very kind of pitfall for the unwary that the 
code revisers intended to eliminate through their studious re-
organization of the judicial code in Title 28.156 
Given the heavy reliance by the public on the United States Code (as 
found in every law library and every computer database),157 an 
uncodified statutory section left out of a finished title may be the 
modern equivalent of what Justice Scalia describes as “one of emperor 
Nero’s nasty practices,” which was “to post his edicts high on the 
columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to 
transgress.”158 Lon Fuller contended that secret law so contradicts the 
internal morality of the law as to not truly count as law at all.159 
To be sure, directed as it is to the judiciary in its interpretive task, 
§ 33 does not bring about the direct injustice of punishing a person for 
failing to obey a secret law, because no ordinary citizen obeys a rule or 
canon of statutory construction. Nonetheless, as outlined previously, the 
                                                                                                                     
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel”). 
 156. See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 
and H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 20 (1947) 
(statement of Judge Albert Maris, then chairman of the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on 
the Revision of the Laws who oversaw codification of Title 28) (explaining that the United 
States Code “is a tool that is very useful, and it is widely used, not only by judges, but by 
lawyers and by the public,” and therefore codification of Title 28 as positive law with “all the 
laws grouped appropriately” is vitally important so that the public may rely upon this title of the 
United States Code). 
 158. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989). I do not mean to suggest that every uncodified statutory provision is an offense against 
the principle of open and honest government. Most uncodified provisions enacted as part of new 
legislation are innocuous or auxiliary clauses that are operative primarily for a short period after 
enactment when attention is still drawn to the original legislative act, such as provisions stating 
the effective date, setting out transitional rules, requiring studies or reports by government 
agencies, or providing for severance of invalidated parts of the statute so that other parts remain 
in effect. By contrast, § 33 is everlasting in effect on interpretation of Title 28, both as originally 
codified and as regularly amended. Furthermore, in contrast with typical uncodified provisions, 
§ 33 contradicts, rather than facilitates, the positive effect of the legislation. 
 159. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964) (“Certainly there can be no rational 
ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that . . . is kept 
secret from him . . . .”). 
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vagaries that it produces in results is a matter of justice denied.160 Nor is 
§ 33 secret in the most formal sense, as it is part of the public laws—
though few would know to look for it outside of the supposedly 
comprehensive Judicial Code. But Congress revised and codified Title 
28 in 1948 precisely because “the public is entitled primarily to know 
what the laws of its country are, and . . . to have those laws presented to 
it in the clearest, most concise and most understandable form.”161 
Section 33 contradicts that congressional guarantee of transparency and 
open government. 
Second, § 33 is a continuing obstacle to faithful interpretation by the 
courts of the statutory provisions codified in Title 28 of the United 
States Code.162 Pretending that there is no structure to Title 28, as § 33 
demands, does not spare the courts from having to classify statutory 
provisions according to their nature. Instead, it forces the courts to 
undertake that classification work in a less than fully-informed (or fully-
transparent) manner. Indeed, given human nature, judges having to 
ascertain the character of a provision are likely to be influenced by the 
evidence before their own eyes—as they can plainly see the section, 
sub-chapter, chapter, and part structure laid out in Title 28—even if 
those judges are obliged by the directive of § 33 to pretend otherwise.163 
This is no way to run the enterprise of statutory construction or ensure 
judicial sincerity in offering genuine public reasons for decisions.164 
Because § 33 has permanent interpretive force, reaching out across 
the decades, Congress is well justified in removing its continuing 
mischievous effects. Repealing § 33 shows no unseemly disregard for 
the legislative intent of a past Congress, for this uncodified directive is 
not confined in application to the legislative actions of the past. As a 
brief perusal of the notes in the United States Code Annotated quickly 
reveals, Congress has amended Title 28 on dozens of occasions since 
1948, acting on a nearly annual basis to incorporate new language or 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See supra Part III. 
 161. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and 
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 10 (1947) 
(statement of Rep. Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws). 
 162. See supra Part IV. 
 163. See supra Part III.B. 
 164. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 988 (2008) (“Since it 
is usually wrong to deceive others, judges should be truthful about the reasons for their 
decisions.”); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 
(1987) (arguing that requiring judges to provide candid reasons for their decisions “serves a vital 
function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power” and that a lack of candor “serves to 
increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judging and of judges”); s e also Laura E. 
Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 140 (1998) (arguing that judicial candor is especially important in 
jurisdictional rulings because “clarity is particularly welcome in this field [of federal court 
jurisdiction] given the plethora of other roadblocks to understanding”). 
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new sections into the part, chapter, and subchapter structure of the 
Judicial Code. 
Surely it is not likely that the average member of Congress is any 
more aware of this uncodified blinding instruction than the average 
judge, lawyer, or federal courts scholar. Thus, our federal legislative 
representatives almost certainly are regularly asked to vote on revisions 
and additions to the visible framework of the Judicial Code under the 
mistaken impression that legislative choices to locate provisions within 
that structure means something. Thus, as discussed previously,165 
Congress itself has been blinded by § 33, without even being aware that 
its legislative arrows may fail to reach a partially hidden target. 
VI.   STRUCTURAL CONTEXT AS A REINVIGORATED TOOL TO 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDICIAL CODE 
Finally, a few words are in order about how interpretation of Title 28 
might look in the brighter light that would come with the dawn of a new 
day after repeal of § 33. While attention to structure would bring about 
some changes—among other things clarifying that some statutory 
provisions do or do not have a jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional 
character and bringing about consistent treatment of similarly-worded 
and codified provisions—dramatic changes need not be feared. 
To say that an inference of legislative construction maybe drawn by 
reason of the location of a statute in a designated part or chapter having 
a distinct caption would not be to say that any particular inference must 
be drawn in every case, much less that other compelling evidence of 
statutory meaning would be neglected. In U ited States v. Fisher,166 the 
two-hundred-year-old decision quoted at the beginning of this Article, 
Chief Justice Marshall agreed that the name of a legislative act cannot 
“controul plain words in the body of the statute.”167 Nonetheless, he 
explained, when ambiguity is present, “the title claims a degree of 
notice, and will have its due share of consideration.”168 
Even more directly on point with respect to the importance of 
location of a section within a statutory structure is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 
Inc.,169 from the 2007 Term. In concluding that the transfer of an asset 
by a debtor in bankruptcy is eligible for a statutory exemption from a 
stamp tax only when transferred after confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan 
by the bankruptcy court, the Court found “it informative that Congress 
placed [the statutory section providing for an exemption from the tax] in 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See supra Part IV. 
 166. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358 (1805). 
 167. Id. at 386. 
 168. Id. 
 169. 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008). 
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a subchapter entitled, ‘POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS.’”170 The 
Court acknowledged that “a subchapter heading cannot substitute for 
the operative text of the statute,” but emphasized that titles and headings 
“‘are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a 
statute.’”171 The Court then reiterated that “[t]he placement of [the tax 
exemption section] within a subchapter expressly limited to 
postconfirmation matters undermines [the respondent’s] view that [the 
section] covers preconfirmation transfers.”172 
Repealing § 33 and fully restoring the vitality of contextual analysis 
as part of the interpretive enterprise for the Judicial Code would not 
mean that the answers are always foreordained. Identifying the part or 
chapter in which a statutory provision is located may not yield the full 
operative meaning of the language, especially as we move from the 
basic classification of a statutory section to more detailed questions of 
application of the statutory provision. Examining the statutory structure 
serves as a tool to interpretation, not a talisman. 
John F. X. Finn, former special counsel to the House Committee on 
Revision of the Laws, testified at the 1947 legislative hearings on the 
codification of Title 28 that he was “proudest of the way this proposed 
code deals with jurisdiction, venue, removal of causes, full faith and 
credit, and evidence and procedure.”173 Finn explained that while such 
words as “jurisdiction” and “procedure” may be “but labels to the 
layman,” “[t]o lawyers they are the pitfalls of litigation.”174 In 
describing the work of the Title 28 revisers, Finn concluded that “[w]ise 
judges and lawyers have objectively and dispassionately explored these 
pitfalls and covered them with well-drawn statutes so that postwar 
justice may be sure-footed, courageous, impartial, and serene.”175 
It is on these categorizing questions about the basic nature of a 
statutory provision that the classification features of Title 28 are most 
likely to be edifying to judges interpreting the Judicial Code. The 
organizational structure of Title 28 is less likely to shed light on the 
precise meaning of a particular provision in application within its 
category. But, similarly, that a roadmap does not also provide 
information about the repair, maintenance, and operation of a vehicle of 
transportation does not make the roadmap any less valuable for its 
intended purpose. 
                                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at 2336. 
 171. Id. (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)). 
 172. Id.; see also United States v. Bowen, 100 U.S. 508, 513 (1879) (interpreting a statute 
based on “the reasonable force of the language used in that section, taken in connection with the 
whole of the chapter devoted to that subject, and the accepted canons of interpretation”). 
 173. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and 
H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 44 (1947). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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As the Title 28 code revisers recognized, identifying a provision as 
one of “jurisdiction” or “evidence” or “procedure” may make a 
significant difference in terms of how that provision operates.176 As 
discussed previously,177 whether a statutory provision is found to be 
jurisdictional or procedural may have significant consequential effects, 
such as whether the provision may be waived or forfeited or whether a 
statute of limitations in a government-related case should be applied in 
the same manner as in private litigation. 
If a statutory provision is mistakenly characterized as jurisdictional 
in nature, unfortunate consequences follow closely behind. The 
determination of which issues deserve to be litigated (or instead may be 
waived or forfeited) is taken out of the hands of the parties (both 
claimants and the government).178 The party that prevails on the merits 
may be deprived of victory by a belated jurisdictional ruling after trial. 
When a provision is declared jurisdictional, the courts are “forced to 
raise and answer new, sometimes difficult, and often fact-based issues 
sua sponte.”179 As the recently departed David Currie lamented about 
the duty of the courts to “investigat[e] the existence of jurisdiction on 
their own and at any stage of the proceedings,” this is an “expensive 
habit.”180 
Moreover, while the categorization of a statutory section in a 
jurisdictional or procedural chapter would be weighty evidence that it 
has the same nature as the accompanying chapter catchline, a more 
complete analysis of all the evidence bearing on interpretation may 
rebut that presumption in exceptional cases. Even after a repeal of § 33, 
some statutory provisions may be “jurisdictional even though expressed 
in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants.”181 
For example, although not placed into a jurisdictional chapter under 
Title 28, the statutory requirement of a timely notice of appeal in a civil 
case182 might remain a jurisdictional mandate.183 The traditional rule 
had been that filing a timely notice of appeal is “an event of 
jurisdictional significance” because “it confers jurisdiction on the court 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See supra Parts II & V. 
 177. See supra Part III.A. 
 178. Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (“Waiver, consent, 
and forfeiture allow the parties to designate which issues require court decision and which are of 
such relative unimportance to the parties that they would rather forgo the costs of litigating 
them.”). 
 179. Sisk, supra note 49, at 545. 
 180. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 268, 298 (1969). 
 181. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 n.6 (2003). 
 182. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006). 
 183. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007) (holding that the timely filing of 
a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement). 
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of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects 
of the case involved in the appeal.”184 Similarly, under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, the prior filing of an administrative claim is an absolute 
prerequisite to any judicial proceeding,185 even though that statutory 
mandate is not located in a jurisdictional chapter.186 First, the explicit 
and emphatic textual “command that an ‘action shall not be 
instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to 
the appropriate Federal agency’”187 must be given full effect by the 
courts. While structure conveys some evidence of a provision’s nature, 
the express and specific language of a statutory section takes priority 
over classification in a chapter or subchapter. Second, the prior 
administrative filing direction might be given jurisdictional significance 
to uphold the congressional intent to allow the agency to explore 
settlement before the burdens of litigation are imposed on the courts and 
the government and to satisfy the general principle of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.188 
To be sure, restoring the proper place of structure in statutory 
interpretation might provoke a judicial reexamination of the 
jurisdictional assumptions made with respect to such matters as the time 
for filing a civil notice of appeal or the priority of an administrative 
claim for seeking tort damages against the federal government. And 
such a reconsideration might well be a salutary development, leading to 
a loosening of the strictures of jurisdictional absolutes while not altering 
basic procedural expectations in the general run of cases. Even if these 
jurisdictional holdings by the courts were overturned after consideration 
of the structure of the Judicial Code, the courts likely would conclude 
that a timely notice of appeal and prior resort to administrative remedies 
remained mandatory statutory requirements whenever a party properly 
raised the issue.189 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, “[t]he law 
is full of rules that are mandatory in the sense that courts must enforce 
them punctiliously if a litigant insists. Rules are not jurisdictional, 
however, no matter how unyielding they may be, unless they set limits 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam); see 
also Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescriptions, Nonjurisdictional Processing Rules, and 
Federal Appellate Practice: The Implications of Kontrick, Eberhart & Bowles, 59 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 847, 874 (2007) (referring to “the Court’s traditional understanding that the requirements 
for the filing of a timely notice of appeal in a civil case are jurisdictional prerequisites”). 
 185. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110–12 (1993). 
 186. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2006). 
 187. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675). 
 188. Id. at 111. 
 189. See Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 643–47 
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court mistakenly characterized the time limit to file a civil 
notice of appeal as jurisdictional and instead should have treated the appeal time as mandatory, 
thus not susceptible to equitable adjustment but subject to waiver by the parties). 
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on the federal courts’ adjudicatory competence.”190 Only if the parties 
waived or forfeited objections to defects in procedural rules, or 
powerful equitable bases existed for adjusting them in compelling cases, 
could non-jurisdictional statutory requirements be set aside. 
In sum, repeal of § 33 would not prescribe outcomes to every 
question of interpretation. Rather, removing the legislative directive for 
judicial blindness would allow for a healthy construction by the courts 
of a statutory text in full contemplation of all canons and elements, 
including textual context within a statutory scheme and code. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The standard treatise on statutory construction states that “[b]ecause 
a code represents and contains a systematic arrangement of laws, the 
position in which a provision appears in an enacted code has greater 
weight for purposes of interpretation than the position of a provision in 
a regular act.”191 When it comes to Title 28 of the United States Code, 
however, Congress’s uncodified § 33 mandates exactly the opposite—
that the deliberate structure of the Judicial Code be given no weight at 
all for purposes of interpretation. 
Repealing § 33 would allow judges to forthrightly consider the 
structure of Title 28 as objective evidence of congressional intent with 
respect to the Judicial Code. Congress thereby would send the clear 
signal that the structure of Title 28—including the meaningful 
categories of jurisdictional grants, chapters of procedural rules, etc.—is 
and should be common grist for the interpretive mill. Allowing the 
consideration of structure when interpreting the Judicial Code will lift 
the blindfold from Lady Justice so that the contours of the law may be 
fully revealed. 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 
Dodson, supra note 178, at 9–11. 
 191. 1A SINGER, supra note 32, § 28:11, at 494. 
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